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University Autonomy in the age of marketisation 
Colin Simpson, University of Gloucestershire 
Marin Marinov, University of Gloucestershire 
 
Introduction 
University autonomy (UA) is a means of enabling the higher education (HE) sector to 
respond effectively to a rapidly changing set of demands from a broad range of stakeholders 
whilst ensuring that they fulfil their mission as key components of national innovation 
systems. Societal expectations include: the delivery of highly-skilled graduates who will be 
prepared to serve the demands of the “knowledge economy”; R&D outputs leading to 
technological innovation and commercial utility; and an attractive learning environment 
which meets the needs of increasing numbers of domestic and international students. UA 
can therefore be interpreted as freedom from government interference so that higher 
education institutions (HEIs) can pursue their own strategic priorities and allocate resources 
according to their geographical location and market segment. However, since government 
intervention usually takes the form of providing direct income and a strong regulatory 
framework, full autonomy of universities might entail both a lighter regulatory environment 
and more pressure for HEIs to diversify their income streams to make up for reduced direct 
government funding. This model is generally supported by private sector stakeholders, who 
see it as a means to open up this area of the public sector to the markets (McGettigan 2013; 
Lee 2014), and by prestigious HEIs such as many of those belonging to the ‘Russell Group’ 
(www.russellgroup.ac.uk/), that already show the greatest diversity in revenue sources 
(McGettigan 2013, 117), and who therefore expect to benefit from these kinds of reforms to 
the sector (Brown and Carasso, 2013). From this perspective marketisation can be seen as 
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an end in itself enabling private providers to capitalise on the deregulation and unbundling 
of services traditionally provided by public sector universities. It is therefore worth reflecting 
on the purposes served by UA since this cannot be seen as an end in itself. 
In this chapter, the authors link the notion of UA to the marketisation of higher 
education in England with a focus on three separate, but overlapping thematic areas which 
are principally shaped by the three corresponding interfaces introduced in this volume: 
funding and finances (government-university interface); academic freedom (university 
management-faculty interface); and the international context (university-
internationalisation interface). A close analysis of these three areas of the English higher 
educational landscape reveals that certain ‘quasi-market’ mechanisms have been adopted 
by successive UK governments to help them achieve broader social and economic aims. 
However, the authors suggest that, without a clear focus on the social purpose of 
universities, there is a danger that UA will be the Trojan Horse of the free market, that is, a 
gift (freedom from government interference) which will expose them to market forces 
beyond their control, and constrain their ability to take optimal long-term decisions. The 
focus of this chapter will be the Higher Education sector in England, although for historical 
reasons, reference will sometimes be made to the UK where HE policy has treated the UK as 
a single entity. 
 
The UK on the UA “scorecard” 
UA clearly consists of a complex set of interrelated components, and there have 
been a number of attempts to operationalise these for the purposes of empirical research. 
In 2009, the European University Association (EUA) published an exploratory study 
(Estermann and Nokkala 2009) of 33 national HE systems using four aspects outlined in the 
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Lisbon Declaration, 2007: organisational, financial, staffing, and academic. The conceptual 
clarity of this framework enabled the authors (Estermann, Nokkala and Steinel 2011) to 
create a UA “scorecard”, now available as an electronic tool (EUA 2014), showing how each 
country compares with the others across each of the four elements. UK universities rank 
amongst the top three out of 29 countries in each of these four aspects and are therefore 
considered to be “exceptionally autonomous”. This is particularly the case in England, which 
is also considered by Brown and Carrasso (2013, 98) as “almost a textbook case of a 
transition from a ‘non-market’ towards a market-based system.”  
However, although the EUA scorecard can be seen as a useful analytical tool, it also 
has a number of limitations.  Firstly, the conceptual clarity of the framework’s underlying 
theoretical foundation is overly simplistic and underplays the diversity of analytical 
approaches toward UA taken by various authors who have sought to build more complexity 
into their work. These range from studies which have put a strong emphasis on 
organisational structures and human resource management (Felt and Glanz 2002) to those 
that have emphasised academic freedom (Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2006; 
International Association of Universities 1998; 2012; Schmidt and Langberg, 2008).  
Secondly, as an outcome of a largely quantitative approach, the EUA scorecard might 
be seen as portraying UA as a fixed state of affairs rather than an outcome of dynamic 
political and transactional struggle between various stakeholders within a continually 
shifting environment. From the latter perspective, the state of UA in any given country at 
any given point in time will be the result of strategic negotiation in which local, regional, 
national, and international actors seek to achieve their respective rational objectives within 
specific social and historical contexts.  
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A third shortcoming of the scorecard is that it fails to indicate the direction of travel. 
For example, it is often assumed that the challenges to UA appear to emanate from the 
efforts of national governments to control universities’ internal procedures and/or 
curricular content through funding and quality control mechanisms in order to ensure 
accountability for the services they deliver to society. In this conception, the struggle for UA 
is one in which universities gradually shake off the yoke of government interference in order 
to pursue their own objectives in the competitive market of higher education.  However, 
even from this dynamic perspective, there are differing opinions on the direction of travel 
(Tapper and Salter 1995), with some commentators (e.g., Eustace 1982) concluding that 
both institutional autonomy and the academic autonomy of faculty have increased in the 
post-war period, and others (e.g., Russell 1993) judging that the autonomy of HEIs and 
faculty have been curtailed by the policies implemented by successive governments. In 
relation to the recent policy changes in England, McGettigan questions whether UA in the 
form of exposure to market pressures is really in the interests of the public benefit since 
“public interest may be sacrificed for revenue streams, or ‘demand-led’ decision-making” 
(McGettigan 2013, 124). Brown and Carasso (2013, 135) suggest that the new competitive 
environment is likely to reduce the ability of individual institutions to pursue specialist 
provisions and will therefore lead to “a system that is more vertically than horizontally 
diverse”. Cribb and Gewirtz also express concern for institutional and academic identities 
and conclude that the recent emphasis on marketing and institutional competition makes 
universities “look, feel and act like countless other non-educational institutions” (Cribb and 
Gewirtz 2013, 344).  
Finally, the scorecard approach seems to infer that the highest-scoring countries 
exhibit the most favourable characteristics, and that, in seeking to improve their own 
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systems, other countries would be well advised to imitate the policies of the high scorers. 
However, this would be to ignore the messy nature of policy-making, and particularly the 
ways in which policies are continually being reviewed and modified as governments become 
aware of the impact of earlier policies. It has been suggested (Brown 2011; Foskett 2011) 
that marketisation is usually promoted by governments in pursuit of the expansion of the 
sector, increased efficiency, and a reduction of the burden on public finances. However, the 
relative freedom from government interference exposes universities to a number of 
external pressures to which they may be ill-equipped to respond, or which might lead to 
perverse consequences as university managers seek to increase the revenue of their 
institutions by adapting to the demands of external agents (Moutsios 2012). UA certainly 
makes university managers ultimately responsible for their institutions’ survival as well as 
their operational effectiveness, but the increased responsibility does not automatically 
entail enhanced managerial autonomy. In particular, some university managers may find it 
difficult to balance their institutions’ long-term strategic objectives with the need to give 
immediate responses to fluctuations in market forces. 
The recent comparative analysis of UA in five EU member states (UK, Denmark, 
Sweden, Lithuania, and Romania), carried out in the EUniAM project (EUniAM 2014) with 
the aim of advising the Moldovan government on their implementation of UA policies, 
sought to overcome these limitations. Using a mixed method approach, including focus 
groups and interviews, as well as a thorough structural and procedural analysis within the 
context of each country, this study offers a number of policy alternatives which might suit 
the social and historical environment of Moldova, rather than holding up a single “model of 
good practice” as exhibited by high scoring cases. In particular, it was expected that a 
detailed analysis of the contexts of the two more recent EU member states (Lithuania and 
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Romania) might offer a useful counter to the other three. Furthermore, although the 
scorecard ranks the UK as exhibiting the highest levels of UA, it is clear that there is 
significant variation amongst the HE systems of the UK nations. For example, regarding the 
dependence of HEIs on government teaching grants, in 2012, English HEIs received support 
for the so-called Band A and B subjects (clinical and laboratory-based), but nothing at all for 
other subjects. By contrast, tuition fees, currently £9000 per year in England, are non-
existent in Scotland and much lower in Wales and Northern Ireland so that HEIs in those 
countries still depend on subsidies from their devolved assemblies. Another difference with 
respect to the case of England is the presence of 140 alternative (private) providers who are 
able to recruit students eligible for government-backed student loans (NAO 2014). This has 
led to a huge growth of the numbers of students claiming loans in England (from 7,000 in 
2010/11 to 53,000 in 2013/14), with much smaller numbers in the other three UK nations.  
 
Funding and Finances 
Perhaps the single most important source of leverage exercised by governments 
over universities is the funding mechanism. According to the EUA’s (2014) scorecard, the UK 
currently ranks third to Luxembourg and Estonia in terms of autonomy over their finances. 
This relatively high level of autonomy seems to have been arrived at after a century during 
which a number of differing funding models have been tried out by successive governments 
with differing ideological and economic convictions. From 1945, the state took on full 
responsibility for funding universities as part of its general economic recovery programme, a 
position defended by the University Grants Commission (UGC) as “less injurious to academic 
independence than relying entirely on municipal contributions and private benefactions” 
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(Tapper and Salter 1995, 62). Clearly, the tense relationship between the funding 
mechanism and UA was recognised very early on in the modern history of UK universities.  
In 1963, the “Robbins Report” (Committee on Higher Education 1963) very clearly 
linked HE with national economic priorities by calling for a rapid expansion of university 
places to enhance social mobility and to improve the skill levels of the British workforce. 
Although this linkage was not seen as problematic in a period which saw the creation of a 
number of new universities and polytechnics, the context changed dramatically as a result 
of the economic crises in the 1970s, and, particularly, from 1981 onwards, when the UGC 
was forced to impose cuts in recurrent grants. At this time the funding for teaching and 
research was split, with the latter being subjected to periodic competitive evaluation 
exercises. This change enabled governments to exercise considerable influence over 
academic affairs by allocating extra funding for teaching and research in fields which were 
considered as corresponding to national economic priorities, particularly engineering, 
technology, and IT. These changes clearly reflected the contemporary government’s view 
that HE had not performed an effective service to the needs of the UK economy, a view 
which was famously presented in the Ruskin College speech by Prime Minister James 
Callaghan in 1976 in which the purpose and success of UK education were debated:  
“I have been concerned to find out that many of our best trained students who have 
completed the higher levels of education at university or polytechnic have no desire 
to join industry. Their preferences are to stay in academic life or to find their way 
into the civil service. There seems to be a need for more technological bias in science 
teaching that will lead towards practical applications in industry rather than towards 
academic studies.” (Callaghan 1976)  
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This speech is widely seen as preparing the ground for successive UK governments, 
particularly the Conservative governments between 1979 and 1997, to restructure the HE 
sector and introduce market mechanisms “to ensure the UK economy would be highly 
competitive in global markets” (Foskett 2011, 29).  
 
Funding HE in England 
The new Higher Education Funding Council for England, which was set up in 1993, 
enabled the government to develop a relationship with universities which could be 
described as contractual: universities were paid for the services they provided to the 
government and the price reflected the quality of those services as assessed by universities’ 
compliance with the government’s stated economic priorities or the quality of their 
research outputs. An example of this is the way the provision of extra places in technical 
subjects was rewarded through extra public funding. On the other hand, in a period in which 
governments considered that the state had to be rolled back in order not to “crowd out” the 
private sector, universities were encouraged to become less dependent on public funding, 
e.g., by charging tuition fees, whilst governments maintained overall control of the amount 
of money they received by capping student numbers and dictating the maximum level of 
those fees.  
The rapid expansion of university places offered to school leavers, and the granting 
in 1992 of university status to all HEIs which had until then been known as “polytechnics”, 
produced a clear divide between teaching-led HEIs and the more established and elite 
institutions which have access to research funding in addition to remuneration in exchange 
for teaching (Foskett 2011). Universities were encouraged to behave increasingly like for-
profit business organisations and to find alternative income streams by attracting greater 
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numbers of international students and postgraduate students, whose fees were not subject 
to capping. To increase their capacity, universities were expected to raise finance through 
private loans from banks or other sponsors, or through public private partnership (PPP) 
arrangements such as sale and lease arrangements. This period then saw a mixture of 
autonomous financial arrangements and strong government steer in terms of supply side. 
The period from 1997 into the following decade (the Labour government period) saw 
a continuation of the policies of privatisation and marketisation, with the tripling of tuition 
fees for undergraduate students to £3000 and universities increasingly looking to 
international HE markets to make up the shortfall in teaching grants. These policies 
culminated in a high degree of marketisation of English universities with public funding for 
the teaching of certain subjects being gradually withdrawn and replaced by fee income 
raised from government-backed student loans. The second tripling of undergraduate tuition 
fees to a maximum of £9000 was approved by a snap vote in the House of Commons on 9 
December 2010 without any introduction of new primary legislation. Higher fees came into 
effect in 2012 and further reduced public spending on higher education, with the Higher 
Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) teaching grant contribution amounting to 
little more than 20% of the total by 2014, down from about 65% in 2010 (UUK 2012).  
This review of the funding and financial arrangements of English universities has 
revealed a complex evolutionary process in which government intervention has often been 
represented as a threat to UA, whilst at the same time being fundamental to the growth of 
mass HE. The gradual introduction of market mechanisms has been pursued as a means of 
reducing public expenditure and enhancing the responsiveness of universities to global 
market forces, particularly the global demand for English-language HE. However, a number 
of challenges have become evident since the implementation of what Foskett (2011) calls 
10 
 
the “quasi-market” model. Firstly, the cost of covering defaults on student loans is 
increasing at a rate which is unsustainable. The Student Loans Company, set up as a 
government-owned agency to provide cheap loans enabling students to pay for their tuition 
fees and maintenance, has been criticised for failing to reduce public spending since the 
high default rate means that the current system of funding is actually costing the public 
purse almost as much as under the £3000 tuition fee regime: “It has become an indefensible 
system” (Byrne 2014). Attempts by the government to sell the student loan book have been 
abandoned (Morgan 2014) as prospective buyers demanded that their profits should be 
guaranteed by government undertakings.  
A second challenge comes from the deregulation of the sector with the aim of 
inviting for-profit organisations to handle certain “unbundled” services such as recruitment 
or overseas and distance teaching services, or to be alternative providers of higher 
education courses in competition with universities. The problem here arises from the 
essential conflict of interests between profit and quality, and the inability of certain 
universities to control the unethical practices of private partners who have a keener interest 
in maximising their profits than in protecting the longer-term reputation of their partners. 
Examples of this kind of ‘market failure’ are given in the recent investigation by the 
Department of Business, Innovation and Skills into financial support for 11,000 students at 
alternative higher education providers (NAO, 2014), which discovered dropout rates over 
five times higher than the sector average, promises of financial support to which students 
were not eligible (up to 50% of those investigated), students who were not registered with 
their qualifications’ awarding bodies (20%), and many cases of enrolment onto unapproved 
courses. A detailed case study by McGettigan (2014) supports these findings with further 
evidence of unscrupulous marketing tactics conducted by agents chasing ambitious 
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recruitment targets. Since some of these alternative providers and two of England’s private 
universities are owned by large US parent companies, it is also worth noting the findings of 
an investigation by the US Senate (2012) into the financial dealings and operations of five 
private US educational institutions with franchising partnerships around the world. This 
investigation also found evidence of aggressive sales tactics used by professional recruiters, 
unacceptably highs levels of academic failure, and excessive rates of default on loan 
repayments. These institutions were found typically to spend twice as much on marketing as 
on teaching and learning, and to be overwhelmingly dependent on state-provided student 
loans for their profits. At the very least these cases suggest that the marketisation of HE in 
England carries substantial quality risks.  
This brief review of the post-war period indicates that the financial autonomy of 
English universities is not an entirely recent feature of the sector, and, over the years, it has 
enabled them to supplement what has always been considered a relatively sparse amount 
of public funding with alternative income streams. University managers have generally 
attempted to ensure the creditworthiness of their institutions in order to call on funds in the 
form of private loans to increase building capacity and expand staffing numbers. On the 
other hand, the withdrawal of public funding has led to an increase in the proportion of 
private sector investment in universities, reflecting a view of universities as for-profit 
business organisations at the service of a wide range of public and private stakeholders.  
 
Academic freedom 
For some commentators, academic freedom is a necessary condition for a liberal 
society and is essential for universities to fulfil their purpose. In defining academic freedom, 
the Global Colloquium of University Presidents (GCUP 2005), stated: 
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“Academic freedom may be defined as the freedom to conduct research, teach, 
speak, and publish, subject to the norms and standards of scholarly inquiry, without 
interference or penalty, wherever the search for truth and understanding may lead.” 
 
As Hägg (2009) points out, although universities are dependent on government 
bodies, business organisations, and other sources for financial support, it is important that 
this support is not given with ties that negatively affect university autonomy. Indeed, as the 
GCUP statement makes clear:  “The autonomy of universities is the guarantor of academic 
freedom in the performance of scholars’ professional duties” (Hägg 2009).  
Within the English context, it has been noted that there has been a gradual 
withdrawal of state interference in the shape of direct public funding of teaching, and this 
could be expected to lead to an increase in the level of academic freedom of universities. On 
the other hand, mass higher education has been promoted in order to boost the UK’s global 
competitiveness: “The state saw in higher education the vehicle for assisting its wider plans 
for reshaping the UK economy and its human capital” (Löscher 2004, 29). The link between 
the missions of universities and the state’s wider economic ambitions is clearly very strong 
and accountability requirements are one overt mechanism through which the state exerts 
control and indirectly constrains academic freedom. One way in which this has been 
achieved is through the creation of ‘subject benchmark statements’ by the UK Quality 
Assurance Agency (QAA), against which courses are periodically reviewed.  University 
mission statements are also required to refer to economic priorities, and to specify the 
relevance of their academic provision to students’ career opportunities, thus creating a 
further set of standards to which individual academic departments must conform.  
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The result has been an increasing emphasis on vocational subjects and the increasing 
use of a vocational discourse within traditionally non-vocational classes. The latter is 
particularly evident in the ways in which students are referred to as customers, with the 
consequences that students become increasingly distanced from the education process and 
the purpose of education becomes trivialised (Maringe 2011). HEFCE’s Key Information Sets 
seem to confirm this by putting great emphasis on the use of satisfaction indicators such as 
the National Student Survey (NSS) and the Destinations of Leavers from HE survey (HEFCE 
2014). One danger in this tendency is that teaching will be geared towards increasing 
recorded student satisfaction and other scores which contribute to university ranking tables, 
rather than delivering a curriculum based on broader academic principles. 
A further move in this direction can be seen as a result of the way in which research 
funding is allocated on a competitive basis through the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE), 
introduced in 1986, which after 2008 is known as the Research Excellence Framework (REF). 
This is a periodic exercise in which universities compete for funding by submitting research 
outputs that are grouped into subject areas and then evaluated using a standard set of 
criteria relating to outputs (originality, significance, and rigor), impact (reach and 
significance), and environment (vitality and sustainability) (REF, 2014). These competitive 
events shape each department’s and each university’s approach to research by constraining 
their willingness to deploy resources on research which is unlikely to be submitted for 
evaluation. These exercises have been criticised for their “competitive, adversarial and 
punitive spirit” (Elton 2000), but, more importantly, for being “restrictive, flawed, and 
unscientific” (Williams 1998). In particular, they are seen as requiring an unjustifiable 
allocation of resources (Elton 2000) and for being “a primary means of concentrating 
resources for research in a relatively small number of universities” (Barker 2007).  
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It can be seen that the introduction of a highly marketised system has radically 
altered the dynamics on all three of the interfaces discussed here.  The combination of 
reduced state support and increased economic accountability appears to result in a 
concentration on vocational subjects for teaching and an instrumental approach to research 
in which the pursuit of funding is the overriding aim. In this environment it might be 
considered that academic freedom is the most fragile of the four aspects of UA.  
 
The international context 
English universities have been engaged in the relatively unrestricted recruitment of 
international students for a long time and the comparatively high tuition fees for these 
students have provided important sources of income. In recent years, the university-
internationalisation interface has become even more important as cheaper transportation 
and communication technologies have given universities the potential to reach large 
overseas markets and provide a variety of modes of delivery depending on local demand 
conditions. A number of different models of trans-national education (TNE) have been used 
to participate in the global market for HE, including campuses abroad (e.g., the University of 
Nottingham’s campus in Ningbo, PRC), franchised courses delivered abroad by local 
partners, twinning arrangements whereby students study part of their programme in each 
country, and articulation agreements through which students join programmes at English 
universities with advanced standing.  
However, overseas activities pose a number of significant challenges. Firstly, 
universities face the financial risks which typically accompany investment in overseas 
activities. Unless universities have the resources to plough into overseas investments of a 
large scale and scope, the intricacies of administering some of the TNE models may strain 
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their infrastructure without resulting in particularly impressive revenues. Secondly, 
franchised and validated provision can pose severe quality and reputational risks to 
universities as failures are often given a very high profile in the national press. Thirdly, 
differences related to national academic systems, pedagogic approaches, and academic 
qualification frameworks often require specific types of expertise and flexibility which may 
test administrative systems which have been designed for domestic students. 
Commenting on the global demand for English-speaking higher education, 
Universities UK (2012) expect higher education export earnings for the whole of the UK to 
increase from around £8 billion in 2010 to around £17 billion by 2025. This growth is 
dependent on a favourable policy climate (a restrictive visa regime might threaten this), and 
on the UK’s ability to maintain the attractiveness of its universities despite the development 
of mass higher education systems in emerging economies, such as China, India, and Nigeria, 
that currently send large numbers of students to the UK. Whilst representing important new 
income streams for UK universities, these models also have a significant longer-term impact 
by providing a loyal base of university-educated managers around the world with important 
cultural ties to the UK. 
 
Conclusion 
This analysis of three areas of UA in the English HE sector indicates that the 
interfaces generally associated with them are parts of more complex networks of 
relationships. The government-university relationship, which still dominates the area of 
funding and finance in many parts of the world, has been changed in England by the rapid 
growth of alternative (private) stakeholders and the almost complete substitution of 
teaching grants by student fees. Whilst the existence of a competitive ‘quasi-market’ has 
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been a fact since the recognition of former polytechnics as universities, alternative 
providers have brought a more aggressively commercial feature to the English HE landscape. 
Furthermore, the replacement of teaching grants by student fees has produced a demand-
led approach in which HEIs spend an increasing proportion of their resources establishing 
their brand and defending their ‘market share’ (Bradley 2013; Chapleo 2011). However, high 
levels of government intervention have been employed to bring about this new marketised 
HE environment, not least the provision of student loans and a quality assurance regime 
which are not seen as barriers to new entrants to the sector. 
A closer look at the area of academic freedom also reveals the effects of market 
mechanisms in the university-faculty interface. Here again, we stress the importance of 
maintaining clear perspectives on the social purpose of universities if market mechanisms 
are not to lead to dysfunctional behaviour in which faculty are forced to pursue exclusively 
those areas of teaching and research which will lead to the highest levels of income for the 
universities.  
The university-internationalisation interface is becoming increasingly important as 
UA enables universities to supplement their income by seeking alternative income streams 
in international HE markets. As with other market sectors, there is a danger that lack of 
accountability will allow certain players, particularly large international organisations, to 
resort to abusive practices characteristic of unregulated markets. On the other hand, 
internationalisation provides home students and faculty with opportunities to refocus their 
attention, and forces universities to consider alternative perspectives and adopt innovative 
forms of delivery which are changing the face of HE.   
On balance, it seems that the antithetical relationship between fully-marketised and 
centrally-planned models reflects a range of philosophical positions over the purpose of HE. 
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It has been suggested (Dodds 2011) that the debate in England has almost exclusively 
adopted positive economic concepts which are predicated on a view of HE markets as being 
populated by individual consumers and providers. This may have underplayed the extent to 
which HE forms an integral part of the ‘national innovation system’, which requires 
organisational stability to serve broader social priorities.  Dodds also indicates that the lack 
of institutionalist concepts in the debate may have disguised the way in which certain HEIs 
have been complicit in supporting policies that have not necessarily served longer-term 
societal needs. In particular, certain HEs have been able to concentrate large proportions of 
funding available to support research and the teaching of clinical and laboratory-based 
subjects whilst the majority have become ‘teaching-only’ institutions (Brown 2013). The 
case of English HE seems to present a picture of both high levels of university autonomy and 
radical marketisation. It is the view of the authors that one should not necessarily lead to 
the other, and that this analysis should make government and institutional  policy makers 
cautious of assuming that national systems displaying the highest levels of UA, according to 
the EUA’s scorecard system, should be taken as reference points.  
It might also be argued that ‘marketisation’, although perceived to be a product of 
autonomy, has itself diminished the autonomy of many HEIs. The analysis in this chapter 
suggests that whilst universities are increasingly engaging with the market in order to fund 
research and teaching, it may be the case that the ‘market’, rather than the university, is 
effectively establishing the agenda in both research and teaching. Universities which have 
high prestige and independent wealth (endowments), e.g. many of those belonging to the 
Russell Group, may be able to shape, change or dictate the terms of engagement. However, 
the extent to which this applies across the sector is an area for further enquiry which might 
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produce useful evidence by which to evaluate the benefits and drawbacks of the 
marketisation process. 
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